Unable to close with and defeat conventional forces on a traditional battlefield, state and sub-state actors have adopted both ground tactics and overall strategies increasingly reminiscent of such insurgencies as the Soviet-Afghan and Vietnam Wars. As a result of Western military interventions in such theaters as Latin America (Grenada 1983, Panama 1989), the Persian Gulf (1991, 1998), the Horn of Africa (1992-1995) and the Balkans (1995, 1999), forces opposed to the West have largely shifted their methods away from conventional warfare. With the end of the Cold War, the United States and its allies found themselves in possession of unparalleled conventional military prowess based on the combination of professional military forces and revolutionary advances in military technology. In the following essay, these lessons are detailed, informing recommendations for both policy-makers and warfighters engaged in future conflicts of these and other comparable types. By undertaking a detailed study of two such conflicts – the Algerian Revolution of 1954-1962, and the Dhofar Rebellion of 1970-1976 – six overarching lessons for success and failure in COIN operations were revealed. In recent counterinsurgency operations, Western military forces have been slow to adapt, and slow to adopt lessons learned in comparable prior conflicts. Six Requirements for Success in Modern Counterinsurgency
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